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1 Introduction 
Spain's growth over the last four decades constitutes a distinctive case in postwar 
Western Europe. This was largely due to the acceleration of the 1960s and early 
1970s, which could be partially attributed to delayed reconstruction. Before 1960, 
autarky was the rule and Spain's performance appears disappointing from a 
catching-up perspective, since its rate of growth fell short of the potential one 
implied by the country's backwardness. Two phases can be distinguished after 
Franco's death: one of economic retardation and political instability during the 
years of transition to democracy (1975 85), which coincided with the oil shocks; and 
another of return to fast growth after Spain became a member of the EC (1986), 
which ended with the recession of the early 1990s. 
In this chapter, Spain's economic growth since the Civil War (1936 9) is assessed. 
After presenting trends in aggregate performance within a comparative growth 
accounting framework, institutional and macroeconomic features in the main 
postwar phases are explored as ultimate historical explanations for Spanish 
performance. 
2 Spain's economic performance in the long run 
After negligible growth in real GDP per head during the early nineteenth century, a 
sustained gain in product per head took place up to World War I (Table 12.1). New 
annual estimates emphasize the acceleration of growth between 1850 and 1890, 
particularly during the free-trading years (1860s to 1880s), and the slowdown that 
followed the tariff of 1891 and the suspension of the peseta's gold convertibility 
(Prados de la Escosura, forthcoming). The financial costs of the independence wars 
of Spain's last colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) also contributed to 
slackening economic growth. 
The early twentieth century witnessed an acceleration in the rate of growth. A 
phase of remarkable acceleration in per-capita growth and structural change took 
place from 1913 to 1929, followed by the 1930s depression, in which real product per 
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Table 12.1. Comparative performance of Spain's real GDP per head. 1850 1993 
(log-linear adjusted growth rates) 
1850-90 
1890-1913 
1913-29 
1920-38 
1950-60 
1960-73 
1973-93 
1850-1913 
1913- 50 
1950-93 
1913-60 
1960-93 
1913-93 
1850-1993 
Spain 
1.3 
0.8 
2.0 
1.5" 
3.5 
6.3 
2.0 
0.9 
0.3 
4.1 
0.7 
3.6 
2.5 
1.5 
Italy 
0.4a 
1.5 
0.9 
1.5 
4.7 
4.3 
2.3 
0.7C 
0.6 
3.5 
1.2 
3.0 
2.6 
1.9" 
France 
1.3 
1.4 
2.7 
1.3 
3.5 
4.2 
1.7 
1.3 
0.6 
3.0 
1.4 
2.6 
2.5 
1.7 
Germany 
1.4 
1.7 
1.8 
2.6 
6.7 
3.4 
1.9 
1.5 
1.5 
3.1 
2.1 
2.4 
2.8 
1.9 
UK 
' 
0.9 
- 0 . 5 
1.5 
2.2 
2.4 
• : 
1 
l.i 
2.1 
1.2 
1.9 
1.7 
1.2 
USA 
1.6 
. 1 
2.0 
- 0 . 2 
1.0 
2.6 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.9 
1" 
1.9 
1.7 
Source: Prados de la Escosura (1995). 
a
 1861-90. b 1920-35. c 1861-1913. d1861- 1993. 
head fell at —0.4 per cent annually between 1929 and 1935.1 Finally, the new 
evidence points to a fall in the level of economic activity per person, as a result of the 
Civil War (1936 9), at a compound annual rate of —3.4 per cent between 1935 and 
1940. 
The reconstruction period was longer in Spain than in Western Europe and lasted 
until the 1960s, resulting in the level of income per head for 1929 (the highest for the 
pre-Civil War ear) only being reached again in 1954.2 Autarky presided after the end 
of the Civil War for a period of twenty years. After the economy practically 
stagnated in per-capita terms during the 1940s (0.2 per cent), the 1950s witnessed a 
substantial growth per head as isolation was gradually relaxed.3 However, a 
remarkable acceleration took place after the major policy reform of 1959, and this 
lasted until 1975.4, The post-Franco years were of falteringgrowth, with a yearly rate 
of 0.9 per cent per head between 1975 and 1985. Then, following the admission of 
Spain into the EEC, a return to the trend of the Golden Age took place up to 1990 
(with per-capita income growing at 4 per cent), only to slacken again at the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
In short, in early twentieth-century Spain, sustained growth took place up to the 
Great Depression, when it was abruptly interrupted by the Civil War, from which 
recovery was slow under Franco's economic autarky. Fast growth in the Golden 
Age, resulting to a large extent from the post-bellum reconstruction, ended abruptly 
after Franco's death (1975), which coincided with the first international oil crisis. 
With Spain's admission into the EEC (1986), an intense, short-lived recovery took 
place, before a return to slackening growth in the early 1990s. 
When Spain's economic performance is placed within the international context, 
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Source: Prados de la Escosura (1995). 
Figure 12.1 Spain's real GDP per head: comparative performance, 1850 1993 (1990 
Geary-Khamis dollars) 
several distinctive features emerge (Table 12.1). The remarkable increase in Spain's 
real per-capita income, over tenfold since the mid-nineteenth century, represents 
only a moderate pace of growth when it is compared to continental Europe's 
industrial nations. Spain's economic growth departed from a lower stand-point in 
terms of output per person, having stagnated over much of the early decades of the 
nineteenth century. By contrast, Western European nations industrialized, leading 
to a deterioration in Spain's international position. Thus, it intuitively appears that 
the (unconditional) convergence hypothesis, according to which growth rates 
correlate inversely to departing levels, does not seem to apply to Spain's historical 
experience prior to 1960. 
In the search for differentials in Spanish economic performance, several significant 
periods emerge. From the mid-nineteenth century up to the Spanish Civil War 
(1936), only the moderately free-trading decades of the 1860s to the 1880s and the 
1920s represent a mild attempt to catch up with Western European industrial 
nations. In the late twentieth century, the period 1960-75 is a major step in closing 
up the gap. Conversely, three periods appear to be responsible for the widening gap 
between Spain and the advanced Western European nations: 1890-1913,1939-59 
and 1975-85. The turn of the century seems to have been a lost opportunity for 
closing the gap, as comparison with other late comers such as Giolittian Italy. 
Sweden and Russia suggests (Prados de la Escosura, fort hiroming). Economists and 
historians usually stress Spain's poor economic performance under autarky 
(1939 59), in particular during the 1940s. It appears, however, that the 1950s, a 
decade of generalized growth in Western Europe, could be associated in Spain with 
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incomplete catching up, as the comparison with Germany and Italy tends to 
suggest. In the 1950s, as forces making for growth and convergence were stronger. 
those countries like Spain that failed wholly to catch up seem to have paid a heavier 
penally than would have been the case in phases of slowing down. Countries such as 
Spain which remained closed and did not compete in international markets could 
not share the productivity growth benefits deriving from the leading nations 
(Baumol. 1986). 
Nevertheless, when the Civil War is excluded, the largest loss in relative levels of 
income per head (but not in productivity.due to high unemployment) emerges from 
the years between Franco's death (1975) and Spain's admission to the European 
Community (1986). Systematic historical research on the period is lacking and only 
superficial explanatory hypotheses relating poor performance to the difficult 
transition to a democratic regime have been proposed. However, deeper institutional 
reasons seem to have been at work, such as an overregulated, heavily protected 
economy which was cut off from the international market (see sections 7 and 8 below). 
Resource endowments in the postwar period provide some clues about Spain's 
growth. Physical and human capital accumulation was significant in the post-1950 
era, while labour expanded only slowly. Employment grew at 0.8 per cent annually 
between 1955 and 1974,5 to decline, over the following two decades, at - 0 .5 per 
cent, while the labour force expanded at 0.7 per cent. Educational attainment, as 
measured by the average years of schooling, grew at an average annual rate of 2.2 
percent in the period 1950 -75, and at 1.7 per cent per year from 1975 to 1985(Barro 
and Lee, 1993). In turn, gross fixed capital stock grew faster than output from 1950 
to 1973, and the differential growth rates widened thereafter (Hofman, 1993a).6 In 
the period 1950-73, capital deepening (i.e. increase in capital stock relative to 
population) took place at an annual growth rate of 5.7 per cent for non-residential 
capital stock, and even more rapidly for machinery and equipment (8.6 per cent). 
Although such a process continued over 1973-89, it slowed down for non-residential 
capital (to 4.5 per cent) and, especially, for machinery and equipment (down to 3.7 
per cent).7 A rapid catching up in terms of non-residential capital endowment per 
head occurred up to 1973, decelerating thereafter (Hofman, 1993b; Maddison, 
1993)." Given the role attributed to capital in machinery and equipment, as carriers 
ofncw technology (De Long and Summers, 1991), its slackening after 1973 could be 
associated with lower joint factor productivity growth.9 
A look at the sources of growth can help us to assess the proximate determinants 
of postwar Spanish performance. For the period 1965-90, an estimate has been 
carried out by Suarez (1992), who relaxed usual assumptions about constant returns 
to scale, perfect competition and exogenous technical progress.10 At the economy's 
aggregate level, however, Suarez found evidence of non-increasing returns to scale. 
Table 12.2 summarizes his results.11 Total factor productivity dominates Spanish 
economic growth in the long run, complemented by capital's contribution. Only 
after Spain's admission into the EEC (1986) did labour make a significant 
contribution to growth, offsetting total factor productivity's sluggish growth after 
1975. Labour destruction in Spain represented a significant brake to growth over 
the decade after Franco's death. Deep changes in the composition of output and 
employment, together with a dramatic increase in R & D activities, help to explain 
total factor productivity growth up to 1975 (and TFP deceleration thereafter, when 
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Table 12.2. Sources of Spam's economic growth, 1965 90 
1965-74 1975-85 1986 90 1965-90 
1 Real GDP growth 
2 Labour 
3 Contribution to GDP growth 
4 Capital 
5 Contribution to GDP growth 
6 Total factor productivity 
7 (3) as % of GDP growth 
8 (5) as % of GDP growth 
9 (6) as % of GDP growth 
Source: Suarez (1992). 
Table 12.3. Relative growth of Spain s real GDP per head, 1950 85 (Spain's 
deviations from OECD growth) 
6.48 
0.72 
0.42 
9.82 
2.25 
3.81 
6.5 
34.7 
58.8 
1.37 
-1.62 
-0.90 
3.46 
0.66 
1.61 
-65.7 
48.2 
117.5 
4.41 
3.00 
1.69 
5.28 
1.40 
1.32 
38.3 
31.7 
30.0 
3.89 
0.15 
0.10 
6.21 
1.41 
2.38 
2.6 
36.2 
61.2 
Actual growth deviation 
Less Cyclical bias 
Catch-up 
= Adjusted growth deviation 
Less Employment deepening 
Capital deepening 
= Unexplained growth deviation 
1950 60 
0.3° 
-0.15 
1.13 
-0.09 
0.21 
-0.25 
-0.06 
1960-73 
2.15 
0.45 
0.90 
0.80 
-0.11 
-0.27 
1.18 
1973-85 
-0.31 
0.22 
0.42 
-0.95 
-1.27 
-0.24 
0.56 
Source: Dowrick and Nguyen (1989). 
structural transformation slowed down until 1985). 
Empirical research within the on-going debate on convergence and catching up 
has provided evidence on the case of Spain. Thus. Spain's economic performance 
can be analysed using a convergence equation. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) have 
tested whether post-1950 convergence within OECD countries is explained by total 
factor productivity catching up, or just by the growth of factor intensities, with their 
results supporting the former. Their individual country data set includes evidence 
for Spain which is presented in Table 12.3. Each country's deviations from OECD 
trend growth, after being adjusted for catching up, are decomposed into capital and 
employment deepening (i.e. relative to population growth) and unexplained growth. 
Dowrick and Nguyen's unexplained residual accounts for more than half of Spain's 
differential growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, and exhibits the opposite sign 
(doubling the size of the actual growth deviation) for the period 1973-85. 
Such an outcome could provide enough grounds to dismiss the exercise on the 
basis of its low explanatory power. However, the story that emerges from it, when 
the unexplained growth deviation is associated with joint factor productivity, seems 
to be a plausible one, as it is consistent with the evidence already present in Table 
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Table J 2.4. Differential growth of Spain's real GDP per head, 1965-90 (with respect 
to the OECD average) 
A Growth differential 
due to: 
B Initial income per head 
C Real investment/GDP 
D Human capital 
E Population growth 
F Solow factors (B + C + D + E) 
G Inflation 
H Money growth 
1 Variance inflation 
J Exports growth 
K Lagged public deficit/GDP 
L Macroeconomic performance 
(G + H + I + J + K) 
M Unexplained residual 
1965-75 
1.19 
0.28 
-0.07 
-0.12 
-0.12 
0.09 
-0.15 
0.59 
0.08 
0.44 
0.00 
0.96 
0.15 
1975-85 
-1.31 
0.23 
-0.16 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.04 
-0.25 
0.00 
0.26 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.07 
-1.43 
1985 90 
1.69 
0.30 
-0 .10 
0.02 
0.02 
0.24 
0.07 
0.50 
0.37 
-0 .30 
0.05 
0.68 
0.77 
Note: Average GDP per head growth in the OECD, 1965-75, 3.35 per cent 
annually; 1975-85, 2.05 per cent; 1985 90, 2.45 per cent. 
Source: Andres et at. (1994). 
12.2, stressing the role of TFP in Spain's growth. Thus, according to Dowrick and 
Nguyen, catch-up accounts for the differential trend growth in the 1950s, and for 
half of it in the 1960s and early 1970s and, in turn, prevented a poorer performance 
from the 1973 oil shock onwards. When compared to OECD adjusted growth, Spain 
performed slightly below the average in the 1950s, with the increase in employment 
(relative to population) offsetting the low investment ratio per head. Since 1960, 
total factor productivity was the only positive contribution to adjusted growth as a 
result of poor capital and employment deepening.'2 In fact, TFP growth (including 
a reallocation of resources away from agriculture) was not enough io maintain 
convergence towards the advanced nations after 1973, particularly as massive 
employment destruction took place from the late 1970s. 
However, despite the usual association between the unexplained residual and 
total factor productivity, economists remain dissatisfied and try to take a closer 
look at the Solow residual. In a recent paper, Andres et al. (1994) have differentiated 
between Solow elements (derived from an augmented Solow model with human 
capital) and macroeconomic performance in OECD countries'growth since 1965.13 
Table 12.4 presents their results for Spain, showing positive deviations in OECD 
growth up to 1975 and from 1985 onwards, a negative deviation for the 'transition to 
democracy' decade, 1975-85, and in all periods a positive catch-up term and 
negative contributions of factor endowment growth. These results tend to support 
findings from a previous exercise (Table 12.3). As can be gathered from Table 12.4, 
macroeconomic performance, and the unexplained residual that can be associated 
with TFP growth, account for most of Spain's differential growth.14 Prior to 1975, 
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macroeconomic behaviour seems to explain most (80 per cent) of Spain's positive 
deviation from the OECD average growth, with money and exports growth as its 
main factors. However, in the transition years from dictatorship to democracy, 
macroeconomic instability (high inflation, unbalanced budget) led Spain to 
underperform. Finally, after Spam became a member of the EEC (1986), 
macroeconomic performance (lower inflation and money, but nol export, growth) 
contributed to a positive growth differential (up to 40 per cent). 
It may be concluded, then, that the analysis of proximate determinants of growth 
largely confirms, and extends, the more descriptive evaluation carried out earlier in 
the paper. In the rest of it, a closer look at the main phases of macroeconomic 
performance can illuminate the search for ultimate causes of growth, in which the 
role of incentives provided by the institutional framework appears to be determinant. 
3 The legacy of the 1930s and the Civil War (1936-9) 
The impact of the Great Depression on Spain is not only a major economic but also 
a political and social issue, as it coincided with the instauration of Spain's Second 
Republic (1931), after more than half a century of constitutional monarchy that 
ended in a bloody civil war. Was the depression a significant cause of the political 
and sock:' unrest? Did economic policies exacerbate the political and social climate, 
leading to civil strife and, eventually, to a military uprising? 
Historical studies have tended to confirm contemporary perceptions of a 
relatively mild impact of the depression, as the relatively moderate decline in factor 
returns and prices would suggest (Comin, 1987). It has been argued, however, that a 
shift towards a restrictive budget policy and the interruption of public works, 
together with uncertainty about the new political regime, were major causes of the 
crisis of the 1930s in Spain (Palafox, 1986, 1991). Legal changes favourable to the 
trade unions, such as the reduction in the number of hours worked (Soto, 1989), 
might have reduced incentives for firms to invest under the Republic (Comin, 1994). 
Another view points to a tighter link to the international depression through the 
external sector, aggravated by inadequate financial and monetary policies (1 lernandez 
Andreu, 1980, 1986). 
A look at the latest empirical evidence tends to confirm the idea of a milder impact 
of the depression on Spain, given the small decline in the level of real GDP per head 
(Prados de la Escosura, 1995), while outwardly oriented sectors suffered a deeper 
impact (Comin, 1987). Moreover, recent research suggests a less important role for 
the government in the economy, given its size, the policy instruments available and 
the dominant ideologies in Spain at the time. Policies, both monetary and fiscal, 
were not restrictive but the opposite, as the budget was used as an anti-cyclical 
instrument offsetting the decline in private investment and exports (Martin Acefia 
and Comin, 1984; Garcia Santos and Martin Acefia, 1990). 
What caused the Civil War of 1936 9 then? A consensus appears to exist pointing 
to non-economic causes. However, expectations after the collapse of the monarchy 
were not fulfilled, as proposals for land reform, industrial relations legislation and 
welfare improvements were not completed or enforced, leading to social unrest and 
a military coup d'etat (Martin-Acefia, 1994; Palafox, 1991). Finally, given the 
vigorous growth during the interwar period, it could be boldly suggested that the 
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Spanish Civil War might be represented as a redistributional conflict resulting from 
the social and political tensions of an earlier rapid growth period, rather than from 
poverty and economic stagnation as has been advocated by historians. 
The impact of the Civil War on production factors and institutions was not 
negligible. War affected the endowment and proportion of production factors, 
although, when compared to the wider European post-World War II experience, 
Spain's physical capital was probably damaged to a much lesser extent than its 
human capital. Industrial areas were hardly affected by war destruction, which 
concentrated on residential construction, the transportation network and livestock 
(Malefakis, 1987; Barciela, 1986; Catalan, 1992). In turn, postwar exile and internal 
repression removed a large proportion of human capital (Lopez Garcia, 1991). The 
postwar increase in the human physical capital ratio, apparently a feature common 
to most war-damaged countries and one which might have made a significant 
contribution to reconstruction, through an increase in the productivity of capital 
(Dumke, 1990), hardly took place in the case of Spain, and helps explain the 
country's poorer performance during the 1950s.15 
4 Reconstruction: Spain under autarky, 1939 59 
A major difference between Spain and the rest of post-1945 Western Europe (if 
Salazar's Portugal is excluded) was Franco's dictatorship, which emerged from the 
Civil War and lasted until 1975. The dictatorship presided over a four-decade 
period in which a clear distinction can be made between autarky and outward-looking 
development, with the 1959 stabilization plan as a turning point falthough clear 
differences are noticeable between the 1940s and 1950s). Franco's political regime 
may be defined as an authoritarian system based upon a limited pluralism of 
political groups around the dictator, who behaved as a maximi/.er of power (time 
and quantity) under constraints derived from internal political and economic 
conditions and the international context (Gonzalez, 1979). Although not without a 
background,16 Franco's regime was a distinctive one, in which fascism and 
traditional authoritarianism blended from its very beginning. However, the 
autocratic regime evolved enough to adjust from isolation and self-sufficiency, in 
which the economy grew at below potential - even during the recovery of the 1950s 
(Table 12.3) to a cautiously outward-looking economy reaping opportunities to 
reduce the technological gap with advanced European nations (Donges, 1971). 
Thus, the extent to which fast growth under Franco after 1960 may be attributed 
to the dictatorship's economic policies and social stability is a still debated issue. 
Had it been the case, a painfully achieved, stable institutional framework might have 
provided permissive elements for economic development, such as an improvement 
in the definition and enforcement of property rights, a reduction in transaction 
costs, and a paternalistic attitude on the part of the state, gradually moving away 
from absolute ihterventionism during the 1950s (Gonzalez, 1979, 1989/90; Martin 
Acefia, 1994). To elucidate whether there was a causal link between Francoism and 
growth and catching up, macrocconomic performance under the dictatorship will 
be surveyed and its main policies discussed below. However, some caveats about the 
beginnings of Franco's dictatorship are required.17 Uncertainty about its viability 
after World War II led Franco's regime to give priority to immediate political 
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stability over any other competing goal, even though such a choice would condition 
subsequent growth through a misallocation of resources. This strong constraint 
provided, in turn, a specially advantageous position to those (already powerful) 
small groups and coalitions which, in exchange for support to the dictatorship 
would derive rents from the public sector and even control the state's economic 
decisions (Fraile, 1991, 1993). 
After the Civil War, the new economic authorities decided to follow a new scheme 
of autarkic development. Such a choice, favoured by the new authorities' ideology 
was conditioned by the international isolation that followed the Axis powers' defeat 
in World War II. A widely accepted perception of Spain as a backward 
non-industrialized society, in which both private firms (because of the lack of 
cntrepreneurship) and the government (through free trade policies) had failed to 
promote industrialization, led to a view of the new totalitarian state as the only 
institution able to achieve Spain's sustained growth and catching up through 
economic intervention (Martin Acefia and Comin, 1991). 
In postwar Spain, as in the rest of Europe after 1945. government intervention 
was perceived as a crucial instrument for the post-bellum recovery World War II 
and the United Nations' boycott (1946), plus the exclusion from reconstruction 
plans and international organizations such as Marshall Aid and Bretton Woods 
reinforced nationalistic tendencies towards self-sufficiency, although the Cold War 
gradually relaxed Spain's isolation throughout the 1950s.'8 Eagerness to embrace 
regulation and state intervention was a common feature of postwar Europe 
counterweighted by the Marshall Plan, which in turn provided the environment for 
a pro-market economic policy (De Long and Eichengreen, 1993) 
Although American aid started in 1951 and led to influential economtc and 
military agreements in 1953, Spain's case provides support for the counterfactual 
proposit.on that, had the Marshall Plan not been enforced, product and factor 
market controls, quotas and foreign exchange rationing would have dominated 
economic policies. In fact, government intervention and planning in Spain aimed at 
reachingcconomicself-sufficiency.includingtcchnologicalindependence once the 
expectations of technological transfers from Nazi Germany vanished (Lopez 
Garcia, 1991) - regardless of the opportunity cost involved. Nevertheless Spain 
obtained $1.1 billion from the US government over 1951-9, which amounted to 18 
per cent of the goods and services imported during these years (or 1.6 per cent of 
GDI). Had Spain received the S676 million aid in a single year expected from the 
Marshall Plan by the Francoist authorities, it would have represented over 20 per 
cent of GDP in 1949 (Donges, 1976; Prados de la Escosura, 1995) 
The need to rely on a coalition of nationalistic and fascist elements during the 
initial uncertain stages of the new regime conditioned the dictatorship's industrial 
policy, aggravated by the lack of managerial and engineering skills needed to carry 
it forward. Industrialists, who had opposed the Republic's welfare and ^distributive 
policies, adopted a hesitant attitude towards Franco's regime in its early stages 
thus, the lack of human capital, on the one hand, and the new regime's urge to 
industrialize, on the other, made strategic factors of asymmetrical information and 
the How ol personnel from private industries to interventory agencies, eventually 
leading to the capture of these agencies by interest groups (Fraile, 1993). 
The autarkic model of development was built around a policy of protectionism 
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Source: Prados de la Escosura (1995). 
Figure 12.2 Rate of inflation: Spain. 1929-93 (calculated from the G D P deflator) 
which persistently aimed at import substitution, using two basic tools: quantitative 
restrictions and exchange controls. Indiscriminate protectionist policies had deleterious 
effects on Spanish economic performance, according to most economists and 
historians. The exchange control policy implied the imposition of an official fixed 
exchange rate within a context of persistent inflation differentials between Spain 
and its commercial partners, which const.tuted a permanent strain on the Spanish 
currency towards revaluation.19 The appreciation of the real exchange rate of the 
peseta implied a drag on exports and a stimulus to imports and tended to exhaust 
foreign reserves. Such a tendency could not be compensated in the1950s ether by 
the multiple exchange rate system,- or by the 'special accounts'.2' B.lateral trade 
agreements (quotas by country and product) and a trade licensing system were an 
alternative that resulted in high costs, in terms of efficiency, by pwvKlmg the 
appropriate environment for rent seeking and corruption. A foreign exchange black 
market developed and the Spanish currency experienced substantial depreciation. 
The imposition of a top limit for foreign investments in Spanish industry (25 per cent 
of the capital of the firm) was a complementary procedure to prevent national firms 
from falling under the control of foreign capital. 
A proximate measure of the import substitution bias induced by trade controls 
can be gathered from the ratio of domestic to c.i.f. prices.for ™P°«fj™^ 
According to Donges (1971), such a ratio multiplied by 2.5 between 1948/9 and 
1958'9 Import substitution took place mainly among consumer goods, and to a 
lesser extent among intermediate and capital goods. The contribution of import 
substitution to output growth represented, for consumer goods 75 per cent m the 
1940s and 60 per cent in the 1950s, while for intermediate and capital goods it 
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Figure 123 Relative price of capital goods: Spain, 1950 90 (ratio of investment to 
PPP price level of GDP) 
provided 70 and 49 per cent of its increase in the 1940s, and 24 and 106 per cent in the 
1950s respectively (Donges, 1976: 155). Inward-looking policies created serious 
bottlenecks for industrialization, as traditional export earnings collapsed and the 
scarcity of foreign exchange put a brake on industrial growth by restricting the 
supply of raw materials and capital goods. Firms, usually small and relying on 
obsolete techniques, acted below full productive capacity due to shortage of inputs 
(or the uncertainty in obtaining them) and did not take advantage of economies of 
scale. In short, import -substituting industrialization (ISI) resulted in low organizational 
levels and low technical efficiency. 
Another major feature of Spanish autarky was a systematic policy of government 
intervention and regulation of the economy. The state controlled every step in 
economic activity through a licensing system for starting and enlarging industries. 
The authorities also regulated prices for commodities considered vital for 
industrialization, and controlled the evolution of nominal wages in the labour 
market. A rationing system was introduced and remained in use until the early 
1950s, while at the same time government agencies took control of food distribution 
(Barcicia, 1986), and price regulations for agricultural and industrial goods were 
established (although the latter were relaxed in the 1950s) (dc la Dehesa et ai, 1991). 
Distortion in intersectoral terms of trade contributed to diverting resources from 
agriculture to industry in an attempt to foster industrialization. In addition. 
protection and internal regulation forced relative prices of capital goods upwards, 
resulting in a lower rale of investment for a given level of savings and, consequently, 
reducing the rale of growth of the Spanish economy.22 
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Figure 12.4 Budget balance or central government and public administrations Spain, 
1940 93 (% of GDP) 
A strategic instrument for government intervention was the lnstituto Nacional de 
Industria (INI), founded in 1941 and replicated from the Italian IRI, which 
organized and directed public investment in the 1940s and 1950s, and still today 
provides a powerful instrument of industrial policy. Both the failure of post-Civil 
War attempts to promote private investment through government incentives and 
the political uncertainty of the Second World War led Franco's pro-Axis government 
to shift to direct intervention in economic activity. INI was established to 
coordinate a fast, self-sufficient industrialization through a programme of investments 
in public infrastructure and the creation of strategic industries (including defence), 
involving high capital requirements, high risk or short-run low profits. tNI's 
intervention included a great variety of activities, ranging from basic services to 
manufacturing and mining, but under autarky it specialized in the production of 
energy and intermediate goods, responding to the economy's bottlenecks and 
contributing to national defence. INI's role in postwar industrialization has been 
critically evaluated. In short, it has been argued that, while INI eliminated 
bottlenecks with its heavy investment, it was an instrument of inward-looking 
strategy that led to a misallocation of resources (Martin Acefia and Comin, 1991). 
A differentia! feature in Spain with respect to the economic measures followed in 
most postwar Western Europe countries was the maintenance of a pre-Keynesian 
fiscal policy. In fact, franco's cabinets kept orthodox ideas about a balanced budget 
and the control of public expenditure (which was achieved in the 1950s), while 
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Figure 12.5 Current account balance: Spain, 1940-93 (% of GDP at market prices) 
sticking to economic nationalism and intervention. In fact, neither full employment 
nor income redistribution policies were enforced in the post-Civil War era. Under 
autarky, the government budget did not contribute to raising effective demand by 
establishing unemployment benefits, no progressive income tax was applied, and 
automatic stabilizers were not introduced until the 1950s. Government budget 
expenditure on public works, educa tion, health, housing and social insurance was of 
little significance in the post-Civil War years. In fact, social transfers and education 
remained on average below 10 per cent of total central government expenditure 
until 1950, and below 15 per cent until the mid-1960s (Comin. 1994). A full 
quantitative evaluation of the consequences of such a policy, as opposed to a 
Keynesian approach, is still awaited, but it is considered to have reduced economic 
growth (Comin, 1992). 
A constant disequilibrium in the market between supply and demand, which 
provoked a persistently high rate of inflation, emerged as a consequence of price 
regulation. In an attempt to soften this continuous price strain, the authorities 
decided to allow gradual import increases, which worsened the current account 
balance (de la Dehesa el al., 1991). In the 1950s, imports of goods represented 11.7 
per cent of GDP, while exports were only 6.5 per cent (Prados de la Escosura, 
1994).23 Growing disequilibria in the external accounts in the late 1950s (Chamorro 
e: at., 1975) would lead to reconsideration of self-sufficiency and, eventually, to the 
end of autarky.24 
The economics dearly Francoismcan be summarized, therefore, as an attempt to 
achieve rapid industrialization based upon indiscriminate import substitution, with 
severe restrictions on imports and capital inflows, a complex exchange rate 
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Table 12.5. GDP and employment composition: Spain, 1929 93 
Output 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction 
Services 
Expenditure 
Private 
consumption 
Investment 
Government 
consumption 
Net exports 
Employment 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction 
Services 
1929 
29.2 
25.2 
7.8 
37.8 
76.7 
16.6 
10.3 
-3 .5 
47.7 
28.3 
3.4 
20.6 
1940 
32.7 
19.3 
4.0 
44.0 
78.4 
7.1 
17.6 
-3 .1 
52.5 
2.3 
4.0 
23.2 
1950 
30.7 
23.5 
3.4 
42.4 
72.9 
14.7 
11.0 
1.4 
50.0 
20.2 
5.5 
24.3 
I960 
23.6 
30.9 
3.9 
41.6 
69.8 
19.4 
8.7 
2.1 
42.3 
21.8 
6.7 
29.2 
1975 
10.1 
30.3 
8.1 
51.5 
65.1 
28.5 
10.1 
-3 .8 
23.8 
27.3 
9.7 
39.2 
1985 
6.0 
29.4 
6.3 
58.3 
65.0 
18.8 
14.0 
2.2 
18.2 
24.5 
7.3 
50.0 
1993 
3.5 
25.6 
8.3 
62.6 
64.7 
21.2 
16.0 
-1.9 
9.9 
22.4 
9.4 
58.2 
Source: Prados de la Escosura (1994). 
structure, internal regulation and direct intervention. This set of policies led to a 
highly overvalued currency, a current account deficit, low reserves of hard currency, 
inflation (consumer prices increased by an average of 13 per cent per year in the 
1940s, and 10 per cent in the 1950s), and a small and inefficient industrial sector. 
A clear distinction should be made, however, between the 1940s and the 1950s, as 
the latter witnessed fast GDP growth per head together with a significant 
transformation in productive structure (Tables 12.1 and 12.5). In the 1950s, 
substantial changes took place in agriculture, where labour productivity increased 
while its relative size shrank in terms of both output (at —2.6 per cent annually) and 
employment (at — 1.7 per cent), leading to a fall in its relative labour productivity. 
The absolute reduction of the labour force in the agricultural sector represented 0.5 
million workers, while it has been estimated that around one million workers 
emigrated from agriculture in the 1950s (Leal et al., 1975). Meanwhile, total 
investment doubled its 1940s average share in GDP (10 per cent). It has been argued 
that the first industrializing push in the 1950s was a prerequisite for the fast growth 
of the 1960s, since human and physical capital accumulated and the domestic 
market expanded under protection (Gonzalez, 1979). In fact, capital deepening took 
place, with the stock of physical capital per head growing at 3.2 per cent yearly (or 
increasing by more than one-third), while non-residential capital per person grew at 
4 per cent per year, an increase of 50 per cent (Hofman, 1993b).25 Meanwhile, the 
average years of schooling for people over 25 years old rose from 2.7 years in 1950 to 
3.4 in 1960 (Barro and Lee, 1993). , 
Industrialization, however, depended exclusively on internal demand, and the 
ability of Spanish firms to reach external markets was very low. Actually, 
commodity exports, after the postwar boom (1947-53) in which they rose to 8 per 
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cent of GDP, fell to 5 per cent for the rest of the decade. By 1960, manufactured 
exports had hardly reached one-quarter of total exports and represented 7 per cent 
of industrial outpui. Moreover, volatility in import capacity due to scarcity of 
export earnings made investment risky, leading to a lower rate of capital accumulation 
(Donges, 1976). In turn, restrictions on foreign capital inflows made investment 
dependent almost exclusively on domestic savings. In addition, investment was 
penalized by high relative prices for capita! goods, slowing down GDP growth. 
Lacking the capacity to import the necessary inputs and technology, firms suffering 
from insufficient capital, obsolete equipment and old vintage technology were 
unable to compete in international markets. In the 1950s, Spain did not have access 
to innovation and technology through international trade in competing products, 
and as a result it was prevented from fully sharing the benefits of fast productivity 
growth in Western Europe. 
5 The Golden Age: years of accelerated growth, 1959-75 
In the late 1950s, the autarkic system imposed by the Francoist authorities after the 
Civil War collapsed. The need to put an end to Spain's isolation at the time of the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), and to restore internal and external balances, led to a drastic 
change in economic policy at the turn of the decade. Although Spain started a mild 
opening in the early 1950s, associated with the bilateral agreements with the USA, 
the pressure to open the economy increased as Spain joined the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1958) and the OEEC (1959). The creation of 
the Common Market (1957) and the introduction of external convertibility in 
Western European industrial countries (1958) provided a favourable atmosphere 
for growth. This helped a new cabinet in Spain to introduce a pro-market policy, but 
not without a clash within the Franco regime between pro-market and autarkic-
groups (Anderson, 1970). The policy outcome of establishing links with international 
economic organizations was a most ambitious project of liberalization that began 
with a stabilization plan in 1959 (Fuentes Quintana, 1984). A gradual opening and 
factor mobility (capital inflows and labour migration) were achievements of the new 
pro-market orientation, while the lack of structural reforms affecting the tax system 
and labour and financial markets represented its main shortcomings (Donges, 1971). 
The economic reform included specific measures aimed at controlling the growth 
of internal prices and achieving budget balance (Fuentes Quintana, 1989). Among 
the different measures passed to control inflation, it is worth mentioning the 
prohibition on financing the government deficit through monelization of the public 
debt.26 Additional constraints were imposed on the loans drawn by the private 
sector from the banking system.27 The government also decided to control public 
expenditure through orthodox fiscal policies centred around a balanced budget, 
and to raise the prices of certain goods (petrol, tobacco) and services (telephone, 
public transport) supplied by state monopolies, in an attempt to close the gap 
between official prices and their real costs of provision (de la Dchesa el al., 1991; 
Comin, 1994). 
A second package of measures aimed at the gradual opening of the Spanish 
economy to the international markets, while preserving the external equilibrium. 
The system of multiple exchange rates developed under autarky was abolished, and 
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the peseta was devalued by 43 per cent in an attempt to improve export 
competitiveness (Dongcs, 1976: 59). A gradual process of import liberalization was 
initiated by making flexible the different trade regimes effective under autarky.28 A 
new tariff in I960 eliminated quantitative restrictions on 90 per cent of imports and 
marked the return to the use of ad valorem duties, as opposed to quotas, as a 
protectionist instrument.29 The new tariff, still a protectionist one, tended to be 
biased in favour of consumer goods and had a cascading effect on customs duty 
rates, so effective protection was usually higher than nominal protection. Reforms of 
the 1960 tariff during the following years reduced effective protection (and its 
unequal distribution) sharply, from 77.2 per cent in 1962 to 38.4 per cent in 1968 
(Bajo and Torres, 1990).30 These measures were complemented by allowing a 
controlled inflow of foreign long-term capital that, according to Donges (1976), 
averaged an annual 7 per cent of capital formation over 1960-8.31 
The stabilization plan proved most successful after a first year of adjustment, in 
which the severe measures adopted had a negative impact on economic activity (real 
income per head fell by 2.7 per cent in 1959) (Prados de la Escosura, 1995). The 
success of the stabilization plan was probably helped by the ban on free trade 
unions, which avoided wages claims after the severe devaluation in 1959 (Donges, 
1976: 62). Inflation declined from around 12 per cent in 1957 9 to 2.3 per cent for 
1959-61 (Comin, 1993). Meanwhile, the (commodity) trade deficit shrank from 7 per 
cent of GDP in 1957/8 to 3.2 per cent in 1961, and the current account cast a positive 
balance for 1960 (3.7 per cent of GDP) (de la Dehesa et al.. 1991). The increasing 
number of tourists and the inflow of foreign capital, together with the return of 
Spanish capital from abroad, led to the appreciation of the peseta over the official 
rate of exchange, the disappearance of the black market, and the consequent 
declaration of external convertibility for the Spanish currency in 1961. 
As an outcome of the reforms, exports of goods and services experienced a 
sustained growth over the 1960s and early 1970s, raising their share of GDP from 
5,8 per cent in 1959 to 10.7 percent in 1974. In turn, a higher degree of openness was 
achieved as exports plus imports grew from 13.9 per cent of GDP to 29.5 per cent 
during the period (Chamorro etal, 1975; Prados de la Escosura, 1994). Meanwhile, 
foreign investment constituted an average 5.8 per cent of fixed capital formation 
over 1959-74, of which 44 percent was direct investment, and 74 percent of it went 
to manufacturing (Donges, 1976: 108). 
Since 1964, government intervention in economic activity was reoriented through 
successive four-year planes de desarrollo (development programmes). The plans, 
inspired by post-1945 France's planification indicatif, lasted until 1975. The planes 
allocated a prominent role to private firms as the engine of economic development, 
but maintained government intervention in economic activity by means of market 
regulation, public investment and enterprises, and direct intervention in specific 
economic sectors. Planification indicatif was implemented through a wide variety of 
measures, such as public subsidies, tax reliefs, tariff advantages and preferential 
access to official credit. The planes have been considered a setback for Spain's 
liberalization and associated with a deceleration in the rate of economic growth 
(Gonzalez, 1979). It is still debated why the government proceeded so cautiously in 
dismantling trade barriers and regulations. One explanation is based on the social 
costs in terms of output and employment derived from a sudden opening up 
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(Spitaller and Gali. 1992), which complements another one based on the pressure 
exerted by interest groups (Fraile, 1993). A last attempt to liberalize the economy 
took place under the dictatorship in 1970. linked to the preferential agreement with 
the EEC. However, it was cut short by the first oil shock (1973) and the death of 
Franco (1975) (de la Dehesa et al., 1991). 
In such a context of cautious outward-looking policies under close government 
supervision, accelerated growth and structural change proceeded in Spain, as a 
lagged response to the 1950s Western European experience of reconstruction and 
catching up, prevented by autarky at the time. Spain's economy grew and diversified 
between 1959 and 1975(Tablcs 12.1 and 12.5), while efficiency improved remarkably. 
Between 1965 and 1975, total factor productivity rose at an annual rate of 3.8 per 
cent for the whole economy (Suarez, 1992; Myro, 1983), while TFP in agriculture 
and industry grew at 2 and 6.5 per cent, respectively (San Juan, 1987; Gandoy, 
1987).32 A deep reallocation or resources took place. Agricultural share in GDP fell 
from almost one-quarter of GDP in 1960 to less than 10 per cent by 1975 (that is, at 
an annual rate of -6 per cent), while its contribution to employment shrank from 
over 40 per cent to below a quarter orthe total labour rorce(at - 3.8 per cent yearly), 
leading to a significant decline in its relative productivity." Meanwhile, services' 
reached one-half of GDP, employing two out ofevery five workers by 1975. Labour 
released by agriculture reached 2 million in 1961 70 (Leal et al., 1975), which to a 
large extent was absorbed by the 'urban' sector (industry and services), although 
emigration to Western Europe also represented a decisive outlet.34 However, a 
significant percentage of the labour force still remained in agriculture, as a compara-
tively low output per worker in European terms suggests, and as relative labour 
productivity indicates (Table 12.5).35 Given the disadvantage in output per hectare 
derived from poorer soil, a lower endowment of land per worker is behind the 
Spanish agricultural productivity gap (O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura 199?-
Simpson, 1995). 
Outward orientation of Spanish industrialization remained limited over 1959-75. 
By 1972, two-thirds of manufacturing output was still produced by firms with fewer 
than five workers, so size remained a major shortcoming for industry's reaping 
economies of scale and, thus, having access to foreign markets. Manufacturing 
performance was impressive, growing at over lOper cent annually, withanincreasing 
role for producer goods industries (Carreras, 1992). However, it depended mostly on 
home demand (87.6 per cent over 1962-72), with exports accounting for only 22 per 
cent of the increase, and a negative contribution of import substitution (Donges, 
1976: 158, 168). The increase in manufactured exports was due largely to com-
petitiveness (50 per cent) (Donges, 1976:206). Spain exhibited revealed comparative 
id vantage mostly in labour and natural resource-intensive goods, but product-cycle 
goods were increasingly competitive.36 The Spanish experience tends to suggest. 
nevertheless, that industries that had followed ISI strategies in the 1940s and 1950s 
gradually managed to export after 1959 (Donges, 1976). 
In the 1960s, labour market rigidity represented a real obstacle for an outward 
shift of labour demand that could not match its supply. In fact, the low level of 
unemployment (1.7 per cent over 1960-75) did not increase, due to a steady 
migratory flow towards Western Europe. Migrant remittances contributed to 
balance Spain's current account. Underemployment remained present due to strict 
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Figure 12.6 Employment, labour force and the rate of unemployment: Spain, 
1955-93 
legislation that inhibited layoffs of redundant workers, together with low female 
participation in the labour force. The resulting pattern of development in the 1960s 
was, thus, largely dependent on capital accumulation and efficiency gains. Capital 
deepening was substantial, and fixed capital stock per head grew at 5.7 per cent 
annually (that is, more than doubling its size), while non-residential capital and 
machinery and equipment grew at 7.2 and 8.9 per cent pef capita, respectively 
(Hofman, 1993b). Suarez (1992) finds that, in the period 1965-75, most of real GDP 
growth is accounted for by total factor productivity gains (58.8 per cent) and capital 
accumulation (34.7 per cent), while increased labour input accounts for only 6.5 per 
cent (Table 12.2). 
In turn, macroeconomic performance played a decisive role in achieving a 
positive deviation from OECD average growth, most of which was accounted for by 
the differential money supply and real exports growth (Table 12.4).37 However, 
inflationary pressure (7.8 per cent annually in 1960 75), together with occasional 
current account disequilibria,38 constituted a threat that forced the economic 
authorities to impose episodic stabilization measures.39 In summary, orthodox 
fiscal policy, near equilibrium in the external sector, and expanding output. 
coexisting with unreformed factor and product markets and exchange controls, are 
the main features of the Spanish economy during 1959-75. 
6 Shocks and stagflation: the transition from dictatorship to democracy, 
1975-85 
The oil shocks (1973,1979) coincided in Spain with the end of Franco's regime and 
the transition to a democratic society. Structural inefficiencies were inherited from 
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the Franco era (1939-75), and the post-1959 liberalization had been progressively 
curtailed by the pressure of interest groups, resulting in a mixture of market and 
dirigiste economy, whose negative effects would emerge with the supply shocks of 
the 1970s.40 Thus, the late 1970s opened an unstable political phase in which 
economic performance was dominated by disinvestment, inflation and job destruction. 
The oil crisis was aggravated by the fact that Spain was a heavily energy-dependent 
country,*1 whose productive structure was biased towards heavy industry with 
weak demand. Furthermore, the situation was worsened by the fact that Spain's 
authorities perceived the oil shortage of 1973 as a temporary shock. The deterioration 
of the terms of trade, resulting from rising energy import prices, was not followed by 
a reduction in real wages. 1 n fact, between 1973 and 1976, wages (nominal and real) 
boomed. Political unrest, initiated in the early 1970s and reaching a peak after 
Franco's death, led the government to implement compensating policies, such as 
keeping low energy prices by direct price intervention and nomiaal wage indexation, 
thus enhancing the impact of the oil shock and fuelling the current deficit and 
inflation, which rose as high as 24.5 per cent in 1977. 
Only after the first democratic elections (June 1977) were adjustment measures 
introduced (Garcia Delgado, 1990). The Moncloa Agreements represented a set of 
structural reforms and economic policy measures supported by the consensus of the 
main political parties and ratified by Parliament. A non-orthodox mix of incomes 
policies, plus accommodating fiscal and tight monetary policies, were its main 
features (Spitaller and Galy, 1992). Among those worth mentioning are the fiscal 
reform, in which progressive wealth and income taxes were included. An active 
monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation expectations followed.42 A new 
exchange rate was fixed for the peseta (20 per cent lower) in an attempt to improve 
the external disequilibrium, from which derived short-run positive effects on the 
current account.43 Trade liberalization resumed in 1977, but the 1979 oil shock, the 
unstable political climate and the negotiations with the EEC slowed it down (de la 
Dehcsa et at., 1991). 
At the same time, income policy agreements attempted to moderate increases in 
nominal wages.44 However, when the new, democratically elected authorities took 
steps to adjust to relative price changes resulting from the oil shocks, the lack of 
flexibility of input markets to reallocate resources acted as a brake. Until the early 
!9S0s, financial markets remained regulated and segmented, and exchange controls 
on capital outflows remained in place, while the still effective Francoist legislation 
impeded layoffs and flexibility of contracts in the labour market. Thus, if the set of 
measures included in the Paetos de la Moncloa are evaluated against economic 
performance over 1977-81, a favourable balance appears for (a still high) inflation, 
the external balance and firms' profitability (after wage moderation), while it was 
not so favourable for the labour market and GDP growth.45 
The arrival of the Socialist Parly to government in 1982 extended and deepened 
the reforms initiated with the Moncloa Agreements (1977). In particular, the reform 
of the industrial sectors most affected by the crisis (steel, textiles and shipbuilding) 
and the opening of the economy became the top priorities of the new government. 
Financial markets experienced a major deregulation, as interest rates and capital 
movements were freed. After the Socialist electoral landslide in 1982, a devaluation 
of the peseta took place, with short-term positive effects on the current account 
(1984 6), while monetary policy became more restrictive to check the rise in prices. 
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In turn, the growth of public expenditure and the increases of fiscal pressure 
represented the main features of fiscal policy under all the Socialist cabinets(both up 
to 1986 and afterwards). 
The growth of public expenditure from 25 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 36 per cent 
in 1985 was due to the increase in current transfers and public in vestment, and to the 
service of a public debt (which rose from 13 to 45 per cent of GDP in the'transition 
decade') associated with the introduction of the welfare state, and the costs of 
industrial reconversion and regional devolution (Gonzalez-Paramo, 1992). Such a 
major expansion in expenditure, without an offsetting increase in fiscal revenues, 
resulted in a sustained public deficit. In short, during the first three years of Socialist 
government, the reduction in the rale of inflation continued (from an average of 16 
per cent in 1978-82 down to 10.8 percent in 1983-5), and external equilibrium was 
temporarily achieved, while substantial increases took place in unemployment 
(from ) 1.6 per cent of the labour force in 1978-82 to 20 per cent in 1983 -5) and in the 
public deficit (from 3.3 to 5.7 per cent of GDP). 
When the entire transitional period from Franco's death to Spain's EEC 
membership is considered, some major features emerge. The 1973 and 1979 oil 
shocks resulted in a deceleration of economic activity that lasted up to the 
mid-1980s and implied comparative retardation (Table 12.3 and 12.4). In fact, real 
GDP grew at an annual average rate of only 1.7 per cent between 1975 and 1985 
(Table 12.2). Real investment stagnated, while growth depended mainly on private 
consumption. Job destruction (at — 1.6 per cent annually) becomes noticeable when 
the labour force increase over 1975 85 (0.6 million) is confronted with the 2 million 
fall in employment. Agriculture had the larger share of unemployed. 1 million 
workers, against 0.8 and 0.4 million in industry and construction. In turn, capital 
deepening continued, though at a substantially slower rate than in the years 
1960 75. Thus, the stock of physical capital per head grew at 3.3 per cent annually 
(4.2 per cent for non-residential capital) (Hofman, 1993b). A look at the growth 
accounting exercise in Table 12.2 confirms a negative contribution of labour to 
growth (— 0.9 per cent yearly) that could not be offset by that of capital (0.7 per cent). 
Thus, between 1975 and 1985, employment destruction represented a severe brake 
on growth, while capital accumulation and, mostly, TFP gains explain it all. 
However, empirical evidence (Table 12.3 and 12.4) tends to suggest that capital 
deepening was not carried forward sufficiently, and TFP alone was not enough to 
close the gap with advanced countries over the 'transition years'. 
Macroeconomic factors did not contribute to catching up with OECD growth 
between 1975 and 1985 (Table 12.4). Average inflation reached 15.4 per cent, 
doubling its rate for 1960-75, while a substantial fiscal disequilibrium, derived from 
the action of automatic stabilizers, raised the budget deficit up to an average 3.6 per 
cent of GDP. Besides, the slow reaction of the Spanish authorities to OPEC shocks 
contributed to fuel inflation, reduce competitiveness and provoke a rise in the 
current account deficit (up to an average of —1.1 per cent of GDP in 1976 85).4; 
When compared to the OECD average, Spanish exports were more labour than 
capital intensive, and more intensive in physical capital and natural resources than 
in human capital, while they were mainly composed of goods with weak demand 
(Martin, 1992). In brief, a still highly protected economy,*" dominated by small 
firms relying on obsolete techniques, prevented Spanish industry from achieving 
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economies of scale and having access to innovation and latest-vintage technology.49 
Moreover, economic growth during the 'democratic transition' (1976-85) was 
severely constrained by overregulated markets. In the labour market, restrictive 
industrial rules introduced under Franco, which aimed at offsetting the prohibition 
of independent trade unions by banning layoffs, constituted a major shortcoming 
for employment creation (Bentolila and Blanchard, 1990). Among Spanish firms -
most of them small in size, labour intensive and sheltered from competition -
bankruptcies increased dramatically, while the rate of unemployment rose, with an 
average rate of 12.8 per cent over the period 1976-85. In fact, the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (N AIR U) jumped from 3.4 percent in the late 1970s 
to 18.4 per cent in the early 1980s, to remain at a high level ever since (Dolado and 
Malo de Molina, 1985).50 When aggregate demand contracted during the crisis 
years, demand for labour fell and, given institutional constraints, quantity, and not 
price (wage), adjustments took place, resulting in high unemployment. Sectorial 
wages in Spain depended on the consumption aggregate wage, and not on sectorial 
productivity or the unemployment rate. Therefore, unemployed workers could not 
exert a downward pressure on wages, and unemployment has become a persistent 
phenomenon (Andres and Garcia, 1992). 
7 Recovery of the late 1980s and its legacy: the integration of Spain into 
the EEC 
Spain's admission into the European Community coincided with an expansionary 
phase of the international economy, and both contributed to a fast economic 
recovery in Spain. From 1986 to 1990, real GDP grew at an average rate of 4.4 per 
cent, the outcome of cumulative efforts to fight basic disequilibria associated with 
integration into the EEC, and of a closer link to the international markets. Positive 
short-run expectations opened the door to foreign capital and induced a burst of 
investment that was helped by the increase in profit margins and political 
stability.51 In fact, since a large technological gap existed between Spain and 
Western European industrial countries, direct foreign investment brought with it a 
technological transfer (Vinals, 1992). The positive effects on the labour market were 
immediate, and the unemployment rate fell from 21.9 per cent in 1985 to 16.3 per 
cent in 1990.52 In all, employment increased by 3 per cent annually, which 
represented more than 1.7 million new jobs between 1985 and 1990 (as much as from 
1957 to 1974), and job destruction persisted only in agriculture (0.5 million).53 
Suare/.'s (1992) growth accounting exercise reflects this improvement, showing that, 
from 1986 to 1990, job creation accounted for 38 per cent of real GDP growth, while 
capital, growing at over 5 per cent annually, contributed 32 per cent (Table 12.2). 
When placed within the OECD context, Spain overperformed in the late 1980s, 
with a major contribution from macroeconomics. The control of inflation and the 
management of money supply, together with a reduced budget deficit, accounted for 
most of it (Table 12.4). However, although the public deficit experienced a 
substantial reduction between 1985 (7 per cent of GDP) and 1990 (4 per cent), it 
persisted over these fiscal expansionary years.54 
Nevertheless, other economic disequilibria worsened. After the peseta joined the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the competitiveness of Spanish 
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products declined (as is reflected in the negative contribution of exports growth in 
Table 12.4). The loss of competitiveness due to an appreciated exchange rate 
reached up to 30 per cent from the mid-1980s to 1993 (Camarero and Tamarit, 
1994). Despite inflation falling to 6.5 per cent over 1985-90, the price differential 
between Spain and its main trading partners (EEC countries) widened. It has 
frequently been argued that Spain's differential inflation reflected the lack of 
competition in non-tradable goods markets.55 The implication of Spain's affiliation 
to the ERM coexisting with an increasing price differential was an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate of the peseta.56 However, part of the appreciation of the 
peseta was due to real factors, such as a productivity increase translated into higher 
wages, which means that not all the exchange rale appreciation implied a net loss in 
competitiveness.57 
In turn, the current account deficit reached — 2 per cent of GDP in the period 
1986 90.58 Currently, Spain's integration into the EEC has had a larger impact on 
imports than on exports. Over 1986 90, while the integration effect accounted for 53 
per cent of the increase in Spain's manufacturing imports from the European 
Community, it contributed to only 28 per cent of the increase in Spanish 
manufactured exports to the EEC (Martin, 1992).59 However, the external deficit 
was largely due to the private capital inflow (mostly direct investment) that was 
required to renew and expand the productive capital stock. In fact, the currently 
account deficit was more than offset by long-term capital inflows due to its high 
returns over 1986-91.60 
Successful restrictive monetary policy conflicted, however, with exchange rate 
management. When domestic interest rates rose, the inflow of foreign capital 
increased (reinforced by the liberalization of capital markets), leading to an increase 
in the amount of money in circulation.61 The intervention of the Bank of Spain in 
the foreign exchange markets, with immediate sterilization measures to reduce 
domestic credit, raised domestic interest rates even more.62 Fiscal policy, in turn, 
was clearly expansionary, and its pro-cyclical behaviour pushed the public deficit up 
from 1990. 
An international recession has taken place in the early 1990s. In fact, sluggish 
economic activity in most of the OECD countries has shown particularly severe 
features in Spain. The strain in foreign exchange markets, and changes in the ERM 
resulting from the 1992-3 'monetary storm', led to three successive devaluations in 
Spain (up to 20 per cent altogether), which improved competitiveness. The 
authorities decided, however, to keep the peseta in the ER M, trying to avoid the loss 
of credibility that might have followed had the government decided to apply a 
discretionary economic policy.63 Slackening GDP growth (at an average of 0.7 per 
cent), a substantial public and external deficit (-5.6 and —3.3 per cent of GDP, 
respectively), 5.5 per cent inflation, and job destruction (0.7 million and an 
unemployment rate reaching 19 per cent of the labour force) are the main features of 
the early 1990s. 
High unemployment (over twice the OECD average) represents today a unique 
feature of Spain's economy within the European Union. In fact, Spain's labour 
market suggests a case of hysteresis, since transitory shocks, such as changes in 
relative factor prices in the 1970s, have had permanent unemployment effects. Lack 
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of market flexibility due to low labour mobility and high wage indexation are 
considered to be the main obstacles to reducing unemployment in today's Spain 
(Andres and Garcia, 1992).6* The indexation of nominal wages implies that 
anticipated demand shocks do not have any impact on employment. However, 
wage indexation amplifies the unfavourable impact of supply shocks on employment 
In addition, the high costs of layoffs have impeded labour flexibility and created a 
weak relationship between wages and the value of marginal labour productivity. 
Unemployed workers cannot exert enough downward pressure on wages, and as a 
result, unemployment becomes a persistent phenomenon. 
It has been argued that not only legal and institutional restrictions affected the 
low flexibility of wages, but other factors, such as firms' recruiting methods, also 
account for it. Thus, given large differences in labour qualifications, together with 
the existence ofadverse selection and moral hazard, firms may offer wages over the 
market average in an attempt to recruit the best qualified workers, provoking a 
medium-term push on the average wage, and eventually increasing unemployment. 
Finally, severe restrictions on regional and sectorial labour mobility are posed by 
unemployment benefits that reduce incentives to migrate, and by housing market 
rigidities that make geographical mobility difficult. 
Recent approaches to the labour market depart from a disequilibrium perspective 
(Sneessens and Dreze, 1986; [Jean and Dreze, 1990), assuming that the labour 
market is rationed by the installed capacity of the firm, which effectively restricts the 
number of workers that can actually be hired in the short run.65 In addition, a firm 
may be ready to hire more workers at the given real wage, but a restriction on the 
size of the labour force prevents the firm from doing so. Finally, even when the firm 
has enough installed capacity and there is enough labour available, there may not be 
enough demand to absorb it. 
In the case of Spain, Ballabriga et al. (1991) estimated the distinctive contribution 
of the different regimes (potential employment, demand-determined employment 
and labour supply) to explain the observed variation in employment between 
different periods during 1969 88. Two additional variables were included, labour 
utilization (whose increase contributes negatively to employment), and a residual 
term, structural mismatch, which accounts for market rigidities and information 
costs. The main results for the Spanish case are that, during recessions, restrictions 
on installed capacity and demand, plus structural mismatch, accounted for 
unemployment. Moreover, the utilization of labour tended to fall, offsetting the 
decline in employment.66 This fact seems to imply job hoarding, a feature of labour 
markets under high adjustment costs (Sargent, 1978). In recent years (1989-91), the 
economic recession contracted investment levels as a result of firms' pessimistic 
demand expectations, while labour costs increased relative to capital, reducing the 
amount of employment required per unit of productive capacity, and the demand 
restriction operated again (Andres and Garcia, 1992). 
From Spain's macroeconomic performance and policies in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, some lessons can be drawn. The strategy of the Spanish authorities after 
joining the EM U was to gain credibility through a competitive deflation (Camarero 
and Tamarit, 1994). To do so, an overvalued real exchange rate was established for 
the peseta that allowed the purchase of raw materials and intermediate goods at 
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relatively low prices, aimed at favouring structural change. I n turn, economic agents 
were forced to exercise self-discipline in order to avoid further losses in competitiveness 
within an open economy. This strategy worked successfully for the tradable goods 
sector, but not for the one producing non-lradable goods, which fed the inflation 
differential with the EEC countries. Moderation of wages and financial costs did not 
take place because of the high interest rales resulting from monetary and exchange 
rate policies and the public deficit. Thus, the attempt to mitigate the social costs of 
restructuring the economy, by combining restrictive monetary and incomes policies 
with fiscal expansion, faces strict limits as high interest rales and their associated 
effects (appreciation of the real exchange rate and budget and external deficits) 
cannot be maintained for a long time without putting the country's competitiveness 
in jeopardy. 
In turn, market rigidities, which persisted in the post-Franco era and were 
reinforced in the labour market to keep social unrest at minimum levels, constitute a 
major inefficiency in Spain, with unemployment at the highest level in Europe.67 In 
fact, a competitive deflation strategy, trying to improve competitiveness through 
wage moderation, cannot succeed given Spain's high unemployment, as is shown by 
the failure of rising unemployment in the early 1990s to have a downward impact on 
wages.''8 
8 Concluding remarks 
As Spain eventually succeeded in the transition from a highly regulated economy 
under an interventionist, authoritarian political regime, to an industrial democracy, 
some lessons from recent Spanish economic history may be of interest for today's 
developing ex-Communist countries. 
1. The autarkic period (1939-59) resulted in high costs in terms of growth. These 
costs are not restricted to the 1940s, hul include ihe 1950s, a decade of fast 
international growth and catching up, in which Spain remained relatively isolated 
and paid a heavy penalty in the form of growth that was unstable and below 
potential. International isolation, together with resource allocation aside from the 
market, are responsible, it is widely accepted today, for delayed postwar reconstruction 
and catching up. 
2. Whether deeper and more rapid reforms in the 1960s increased the already 
impressive rate of growth and catching up is still a debated issue. It can be 
reasonably argued that faster growth (Table 12.1) might not have been feasible, but 
instead a more balanced development path, closer to that followed in Western 
Europe, would have taken place with lower efficiency and social costs.69 In fact, the 
Spanish experience of the 1960s and the early 1970s seems to question the extent to 
which factors other than capital accumulation and access to innovation and 
technology played a major role in Spain's economic growth, once the main 
constraints of autarky were eliminated. In other words, the allocativc inefficiencies 
resulting from government overregulation and direct intervention in the late 1960s 
(particularly after the planes de dcsarrollo were implemented) do not seem to have 
put a significant brake on growth, as the institutionally oriented historiography has 
claimed.70 Nevertheless, cumulative inefficiencies during the Franco era constrained 
further adjustment to international competition in future years. 
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3. Liberalization in post-1959 Spain was gradual, and several stages can be disting-
uished, linked to international agreements which posed no serious threat to Franco's 
dictatorship. In fact, both after autarky (post-1959) and during the transition to 
democracy (post-1977), financial stabilization was radical, but structural reform was 
gradual. These features make the Spanish case ofspecial relevance for countries on 
their way to industrial democracy and aiming to open up, while maintaining social 
and political stability. However, the fact that liberalization look place over a very 
long period of time makes the Spanish experience of limited use for countries in 
which the transition to a market economy occurs within a democratic context, and 
where, consequently, a strong social pressure exists to proceed as fast as possible. 
4. Once Franco's dictatorship was over and the return to democracy took place, 
a restrictive monetary policy and high exchange rate were necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for resuming growth and structural change in Spain under a 
different set of institutions. A restrictive fiscal policy and moderate labour costs, 
together with supply-side policies to improve firms' productivity and increase the 
flexibility of economic sectors, such as microeconomic measures to increase the 
productivity and competitiveness of the non-tradables sector, are also prerequisites 
for sustained growth and catching up.71 
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1 Less intense than suggested by earlier GDP estimates (Prados de la Escosura, 1995). 
2 Pre-Civil War highest GDP level (1935) was reached by 1951. 
3 Annual growth rates are computed through exponential fitting. If. instead, the 
average rate of variation is chosen, the result for the 1940s improves (1.0 per cent, 
with a standard deviation of 4.4), while it remains unchanged for the 1950s (3.7 
per cent, st. dev. 3.4). 
4 The 6.3 per cent rate of growth for 1960 73 (Table 12.1) results from a new 
linkage of national accounts data (Prados de la Escosura, 1994). Official figures 
cast a lower rate, 5.5 per cent annually. 
5 Employment grew at 0.82 per cent annually and labour force at 0.87 per cent 
between 1955 and 1974. 
6 Non-residential capital grew even faster, doubling its ratio to output between 
1950 and 1990 (Hofman, 1993b). 
7 Thus, machinery and equipment doubled its share, reaching 0.44 of non-residential 
capital in 1973, although it contracted to 0.39 by 1989. 
8 In particular, when machinery and equipment is considered, and Spain 
compared to the USA, France or Japan. 
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9 Dc Long and Summers(1991) predict a growth rate of 3.1 per cent for GDP per 
worker in Spain between 1960 and 1985, while the actual growth was 3.7 per cent. 
10 An alternative estimate of Spain's sources of growth, using an ad hoc framework, 
has been carried cut by 1 lofman (1993a) for 1950 89, with similar results. The 
periodization by Suarez (1992) makes his estimates more adequate for our 
purposes. 
11 Minor amendments have been introduced in Suarez (1992) TFP growth figures 
to allow inputs' contribution to growth and TFP to add up to the GDP growth 
rate. 
12 It was a persistent phenomenon even though Spain performed well above the 
average up to 1973, and below- it thereafter. 
13 They rely on previous research by Andres et al. (1993). We acknowledge their 
permission to use the unpublished results. 
14 However, supply-side policies are not directly accounted for in this exercise and 
should, therefore, be included in the residual. 
15 For instance, in 1950, the average years of schooling in Spain per 1000 US 
dollars (1985 prices PPP) of non-residential capital were one-third of Japan's 
(Barro and Lee, 1993; Hofman, 1993b; Maddison, 1993). This hypothesis is 
explored in Prados de la Escosura (1994). 
16 The Primo de Rivera's coup d'etat in 1923 opened a dictatorial era that ended in 
1930. 
17 As Fraile( 1993) reminds us, dictatorships are constrained by specific circumstances, 
incentives and preferences, within which they maximize their utility, conditioning 
their economic performance. 
18 FAO was joined in 1950 when financial links were established with the USA, 
leading to an economic agreement between the USA and Spain in 1953. Later, in 
1955, Spain was admitted as a member of the UN. 
19 Catalan (1993) provides a preliminary attempt to derive a series of the real 
exchange rate for the 1940s and 1950s that confirms the peseta's tendency to be 
overvalued. 
20 T o m 1940 to 1947 the exchange rate remained unchanged. In 1948, a multiple 
exchange rate system for activities related to exports, imports, tourism and 
capital movements was adopted, lasting until 1959 (Donges, 1971; Gonzalez, 
1979). A weighted average exchange rate is provided by Serrano Sanz (1992) for 
1949-58, using the shares of imports and exports under each exchange rate as 
weights. 
21 It allowed exporters to keep the foreign exchange they obtained from their sales 
nbroad, as a means of payment for future imports. The introduction of a system 
of export subsidies aimed at improving the competitiveness of Spanish goods 
also failed in such a context. 
22 This hypothesis is tested in Taylor (1994) and Lee (1994). 
23 In fact, commodity imports reached an average of 11.7 per cent of GDP for the 
period 1947-59. In the early 1940s they remained around 5 per cent. 
24 A foreign exchange crisis took place in 1959 as foreign reserves fell to S8 million 
from S58 million the year before, while Spain's committed payments represented 
$60 million. 
25 Machinery and equipment per head more than doubled in the 1950s, growing at 
8.2 per cent annually. 
26 This procedure, called pignoration, was frequently used in the last century, and 
constituted an indirect mechanism for (inancing the public deficit that would be 
used as collateral against credit from the Bank of Spain. In fact, at the end of 
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1958, the issue of automatically pledgable securities ceased (de la Dehesa et al, 
1991). 
27 Specific limits were established to rediscount financial assets in the Bank of 
Spain, and the rate of rediscount was increased to make these specific loans more 
expensive. 
28 There were four different trade regimes (state, bilateral, globalized and libera lized), 
depending on the degree of control and on the restrictions imposed over the 
different varieties of imports (de la Dehesa et al, 1991). 
29 Still 20 per cent of imports were ruled by bilateral trade agreements and 
government agencies. 
30 By weighting sectorial rates of protection with the sector's share in output, an 
ex-post (weighted average) effective rate of protection was derived for manufac-
turing by Donges (1976: 72, 76) for 1962 and 1968. Manufacturing (excluding 
food) was nominally protected by 31.3 percent, and by 68.4 per cent effectively in 
1962, while for 1968, in turn, it fell to 23.9 and 31.2, in nominal and effective 
terms, respectively. Durable consumer goods received the highest nominal and 
effective protection, whereas machinery and equipment had the lowest. 
31 A Stabilization Fund was also created with resources provided by the IMF, the 
OEEC and the private US banking system, to face disequilibria in the current 
account without affecting the rate of exchange (Donges, 1976: 59). 
32 Kendrick (1990) estimates a4.2 per cent growth rate for TFP in the period 1960-73. 
33 From 0.56 to 0.41 between 1960 and 1975, taking 1 as the average labour 
productivity in Spain's economy. 
34 Spanish emigration to Western Hurope (excluding seasonal) was 0.7 million in 
the same period (1961-70), according to Spanish official sources, but it was over 
1.3 million if receiving countries' sources are consulted. For the entire period 
1960-75, official estimates recorded a figure of 1.1 million permanent (non-seasonal) 
migrants to Europe. 
35 In 1975, Spanish final agricultural output per worker represented, in purchasing 
power parity terms, 29.9 per cent of the UK.'s,44.5 per cent of France's, and 16.1 
per cent of the USA's (Prasada Rao, 1993), despite the significant catching up 
experienced over the period 1960-75 (O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura, 1992). 
36 Such as leather and wooden goods, footwear, clothing, furniture, pottery and 
glass, minerals and metal manufactures, on Ihe one hand, and chemical 
fertilizers, plastic, rubber and paper goods, and transport equipment, on the 
other (Donges, 1980) 
37 According to Andres el al.( 1994), only Italian macroeconomic performance has 
a comparable explanatory power of differential growth. 
38 However, for the period 1960 -75, the current account deficit only represented on 
average —0.6 per cent of GDP. In turn, the commodity trade balance and the 
trade balance (including services) represented —6.S and —5.5 percent of GDP. 
39 Adjustments were introduced in 1967,1970 1 and 1975 (stop-and-go policy)(de 
!a Dehesa et al, 1991). 
40 An idea of misallocation of resources in the post-1959 years is provided by 
Donges'(1976: 225) estimates of the high opportunity cost of domestic resources 
in Spanish industry. 
41 Up to 75 per cent of its energy consumption was imported (de la Dehesa et al., 
1991: 158). 
42 As opposed to the traditional passive monetary policy followed since the Franco 
years, which adjusted to the public sector need for resources and led to high rates 
of inflation. 
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43 In 1978 and 1979, the negative trade balance fell sharply and the deficit on 
current account disappeared. 
44 Pay increases were defined as a function of expected inflation, instead of last 
year's inflation. This measure, despite being a great step forward to break the 
traditional wage bargaining mechanism, would become a big obstacle to 
fighting inflation in the 1980s. In fact, nominal labour costs grew steadily at a 
higher rate than inflation. 
45 A brief sketch of the delayed Spanish reaction to the oil shocks could be as 
follows. When the relative price of energy and raw materials rose, firms reacted 
by reallocating their inputs so as to increase their marginal productivity. The fall 
in the demand for energy and raw materials reduced labour marginal productivity. 
and firms had to compensate through a reduction in their number of employees 
at a given real wage. The contraction of the demand for energy, raw materials 
and labour also reduced capital marginal productivity, leading firms to reduce 
their volume of investment. As a consequence, the change in relative prices of 
energy and raw materials provoked a contraction in aggregate supply, which 
reduced real output growth and raised the rate of inflation. Workers suffered an 
important fall in real wages as a result of increases in prices, and reacted by 
demanding higher nominal wages. As a consequence of higher input costs (raw 
materials, energy and labour) and the fall in internal demand (as unemployment 
increased), profitability declined and firms reacted by reducing investment and 
employment demand once again. Some firms tried to avoid the economic crisis 
with new credits (thanks to the negative real interest rales, due to moderate 
nominal interest rates coexisting with high rates of inflation). Eventually, the 
measures of monetary restriction and the new attitude of lenders in a context of 
high inflation provoked an increase in real interest rates which produced a 
financial crisis in many firms. 
46 Which was reinforced by the authorities' decision to keep Spain in the NATO 
military structure after joining (1981) and to accelerate economic integration 
into the European Community, achieved in 1986, which was widely viewed in 
Spain as the only means to reach political stability and to secure democracy (de 
la DchesaetaL, 1991). 
47 Meanwhile, the commodity trade deficit and the (total) trade deficit represented 
an average —5.4 and —4.1 per cent of GDP, respectively. 
48 The average effective protection in 1980 was 33.7 per cent (Bajo and Tones. 1990). 
49 In fact, by 1985, 80 per cent of firms still had fewer than ten workers, and 
R & D represented 1.1 per cent of manufacturing value added, against 4.6 per 
cent in the EEC (Martin, 1992). 
50 De la Dehesa et al (1991) provide alternative NAIRU estimates for 1974-9.6.6 
percent, and 1980 4, 11.3 percent. Crafts (1993), in turn, suggests that NAIRU 
reached 9.7 per cent in 1969-79, and 15 per cent in 1980-8. 
51 The yearly increase in real investment reached a peak of 15 per cent in I9S8. 
52 For the years 1986-90, the unemployment rale represented, however, an average 
of 19.1 per cent. 
53 Employment grew faster than active population (1.1 million). Labour creation in 
1985-90 represented 0.3, 0.4 and 1.5 million in industry, construction and 
services, respectively. 
54 An average public deficit of 3.8 per cent of GDP for 1986-90. 
55 In fact, given their lower productivity, because of a lower capital/labour ratio 
and similar wage levels, non-tradables (and services, in particular) reached 
higher prices. 
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56 Spanish relative prices rose both because of structural change and internal 
imbalances, i.e. the impact of non-tradables on tradable goods, the small size and 
backward technologies of firms, and labour market rigidities. 
57 Factors that favoured an appreciation of the peseta were the inflow of capital 
and the terms of trade gain derived from a fall in oil prices, while the reduction of 
tariff barriers with entry into the EC and changes in consumer preferences 
towards foreign goods tended to cancel it out. 
58 Over —5 per cent of GDP for the trade balance. 
59 Martin (1992:156) found that in the years 1986 90 final demand contributed 35 
per cent and competitiveness 12 per cent to the increase in Spain's imports of 
manufactured goods from the EEC. In the case of Spanish manufactured exports 
to the EEC, Common Market demand provided 72 per cent, while competitiveness 
made a negative contribution. The overall increase in manufactured exports was 
only 38 per cenl of that for manufactured imports. 
60 Long-term capital inflows represented 2.8 per cent of GDP over 1986-91, and 
direct investment, 1.4 per cenl. Meanwhile, the current account deficit reached 
— 1.5 per cent and the trade deficit, —5.2 per cent. 
61 Plus an overvaluation of the peseta and negative consequences on the current 
account. 
62 In 1987 ihe targets for the monetary aggregate were revised, and some years later 
certain less orthodox measures were implemented. For example, in 1989 the 
Bank of Spain made explicit recommendations to commercial banks to impose 
credit rationing, and from 1987 to 1989 the control of exchange became a 
frequent policy. 
63 The decision to stick to the ERM, in contrast to the cases of Italy and the UK, 
might also be related to the negative experience ofthe 1 S90s, when Spain gave up 
the gold convertibility of the peseta (Martin Acena, 1993). The poorer performance 
of Spain, as compared to these two other countries, deserves a thorough 
investigation (cf. Camarero and Tarnarit, 1994). 
64 This paragraph draws heavily on Andres and Garcia (1992). 
65 Thus, potential employment is the number of workers that corresponds to the 
full utilization ofthe installed productivity capacity. 
66 From the quantitative exercise it emerges that, in the late Franco years 
(1969 70 to 1971-4), the levels of installed capacity (0.6 per cent), demand (0.3 
per cenl) and labour availability (1.3 per cent) accounted for all observed 
employment growth (2.0 per cent), although structural mismatch (-0.4 per 
cent) and a high labour utilization ( -0 .6 per cent) reduced the explained 
employment growth (1.2 per cent). After the first oil shock and during the 
'transition' years (1971-4 to 1975 82) there were negative effects on employment 
derived from restrictions in the installed capacity (-2.1 per cent), in demand 
( -4 .8 per cenl) and in structural mismatch (-1.9 per cent), while positive 
effects were due to the fall in labour utilization (1.9) and supply (0.1), which 
together account for all the observed employment destruction (-7.7 per cent). 
A similar picture is obtained for the post-1979 oil shock (1975-82 to 1983-6), 
in which the negative contribution of capacity utilization (-5.6 per cent), 
demand (-5 .9 per cent) and structural mismatch (-3.3 per cent) increased, 
hardly offset by the decline in labour utilization (0.6 per cent) and supply (0 1 
per cent), amounting to all the observed decline in employment (-12.9 per 
cent). Finally, over "the 1980s (1983-6 to 1987-8) positive contributions to 
observed employment growth (3.8 per cent) are derived from recovery of the 
levels of installed capacity (1.5 per cent), demand (2.5 per cent) and supply (0.2 
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per cent), while the rise in labour uttli/ation played a negative part ( — 0.9 per 
cent). 
67 Thereis an ongoing debate about the reliability and feasibility of unemployment 
figures for Spain, as the informal sector represents a non-negligible share of total 
economic activity. Adjusting for employment in the informal sector would 
probably cast a lower unemployment rale that, nevertheless, would have 
increased significantly since 1976. 
68 ]n fact, Spain's unit labour costs have increased to those in the EEC. 
69 The comparison of industrial performance in Spain and Italy seems to reinforce 
the argument (cf. Carreras, 1987, 1992). 
70 As Blanchard (1993: 232) recently put it. when one looks at postwar growth 
rates, the basic impression is that all countries had impressively high growth, no 
matter what strategy was being pursued'. If the post-1959 Spanish fast growth is 
viewed as a delayed postwar recovery, that contention would apply to Spain. 
71 In particular, the reform of the services sector (transportation, health, education), 
which is linked to the reform of public administration. 
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